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Accidents Happen: Psychological Empowerment as a Moderator of  
Accident Involvement and Its Outcomes 
Abstract 
Research in the occupational safety realm has tended to develop and test models aimed at 
predicting accident involvement in the workplace, with studies treating accident involvement as 
the starting point and examining its outcomes being more rare. In the current study, we examine 
the relationship between accident involvement and a series of outcomes drawing upon a learned 
helplessness theory perspective. Specifically, we predicted that psychological empowerment would 
moderate the relationship between prior accident involvement and outcomes. We tested our 
hypotheses on a sample of 392 employees and their 66 supervisors working in an iron and steel 
manufacturing firm in Southern Turkey, using data collected from employees and their supervisors 
via four separate surveys. Results suggest that accident involvement was positively related to 
supervisor rated employee withdrawal, production deviance, and sabotage only when 
psychological empowerment was low. The results illustrate that workplace accidents have indirect 
costs in the form of higher withdrawal and maladaptive behaviors, and organizations may 
inoculate employees against some of these outcomes via higher psychological empowerment.  
Keywords: Workplace safety, psychological empowerment, withdrawal, counterproductive 
behaviors.  
  
ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT                                                                                                     3 
 
Accidents Happen: Psychological Empowerment as a Moderator of  
Accident Involvement and Its Outcomes 
Safety from workplace accidents and injuries continues to be a challenge for employees 
and employers alike. In 2014 alone, 13 employees died each day as a result of workplace accidents 
in the United States (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2015). Statistics are equally 
alarming in the rest of the world with the International Labor Organization (2015) reporting that 
globally every 15 seconds one employee dies and 153 employees have a workplace accident. 
Worse yet, research shows that these statistics underestimate the number of accidents and “near 
misses” experienced on a day-to-day basis (Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008). Despite rising 
awareness of the role employers play in preventing them by investing in safety measures, accidents 
and injuries continue to occur. As a result, understanding antecedents of accidents and injuries in 
the workplace has been of increasing interest to scholars and practitioners alike. Studies, to date, 
have identified numerous factors contributing to the occurrence of accidents and injuries, including 
noncompliance with regulations (Neal & Griffin, 2006), the absence of a positive climate for 
safety (Zohar, 2000), burnout (Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011), and leadership (Barling, 
Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002). 
Reducing and eliminating accidents and injuries is clearly a worthy goal. At the same time, 
there is increasing recognition that supplementing an “error prevention” approach to safety with an 
“error management” focus would be beneficial (Frese & Keith, 2015; van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & 
Sonnentag, 2005). According to this perspective, in addition to understanding what causes 
accidents, it is also essential to understand and manage their aftermath. As a case in point, there is 
a stream of literature examining the cognitive processes and behaviors following involvement in 
safety incidents, highlighting how individuals learn from accidents (Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 
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2014). For example, Burke and Signal (2010), in their summary model of workplace safety 
literature, regard accidents and injuries as precursors to dialogue and reflection. These reflections, 
in turn, are thought to be related to subsequent safety motivation, and future experiences of 
accidents and injuries. Beus, Payne, Bergman, and Arthur (2010) showed that experience of 
injuries is associated with subsequent perceptions of safety climate, confirming that accident 
involvement may also lead to recalibrations of feelings of safety. Further, research focused on how 
learning from mistakes may be enhanced through interventions such as after event reviews (Dunn, 
Scott, Allen, & Bonilla, 2016; Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006) and “staff rides” which involve 
recreating the event coupled with reflection and discussion (Becker & Burke, 2014).  
Despite these advances, there remain two theoretically important gaps in studies examining 
outcomes of accident involvement. First, outcomes of accident involvement have been primarily 
limited to safety related cognitions, attitudes, and learning (cf. Barling, Kelloway, & Iverson, 
2003). This is an oversight because the effects of accident involvement may spill over to other 
aspects of the employment relationship. From a person-centric perspective (Weiss & Rupp, 2011), 
being involved in a workplace accident is an aversive and non-routine life event, threatening the 
person’s fundamental need for safety. Even when such events do not result in an injury, employees 
who were involved in accidents may be affected by the experience, in the form of withdrawal from 
work or productivity losses. Thus, understanding the outcomes of accident involvement is 
important to get a more accurate understanding of the true cost of unsafe work, and to more 
accurately delineate the nomological network of accident involvement. At the same time, scholars 
point out that it is not exposure to aversive events per se, but experiencing these events while also 
lacking control over them that creates a sense of helplessness in individuals and drives their 
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reactions (Wortman & Brehm, 1975). As a result, examinations of employee reactions to accident 
involvement would benefit from adopting a contextual viewpoint.   
Second, to our knowledge, no studies have examined which factors may possibly inoculate 
employees against adverse reactions and help restore normality in the aftermath of being involved 
in an accident. This is a noteworthy omission because understanding factors that help with 
management of accidents once they occur complements studies investigating antecedents of 
accidents. An accident can be a demoralizing, damaging event and it is perhaps normal and 
expected that accident involvement could be associated with disengaged behaviors. The danger of 
this possibility is that it could put employees into a negative feedback loop: being involved in an 
accident may damage morale and erode employee presence at work, which, as prior research has 
shown, could result in further accidents (e.g., Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009). Are 
there precautions managers may take in the work environment so that being involved in an 
accident does not necessarily result in outcomes such as withdrawal from work or retaliation 
against the organization? Managers may find themselves in a situation where they have to deal 
with the aftermath of occupational accidents, and understanding the conditions under which safety 
motivation and productivity of these employees remain high is important for the effective 
management of employees in safety sensitive jobs. This is a significant theoretical gap because the 
occupational safety literature has not yet examined the conditions under which employees who 
have been involved in safety related events can retain positive attitudes and behaviors.  
In the current study, we develop and test a model of employee reactions to being involved 
in workplace accidents. We base our model on learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975). 
Consistent with this theory, we predict that employees will react to being involved in workplace 
accidents more negatively when they have lower levels of control over their jobs, or when they 
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experience low levels of psychological empowerment. Learned helplessness theory suggests that 
employees exposed to aversive events in the absence of control experience three categories of 
reactions: avoiding the aversive event in the future, withdrawal, and displaying maladaptive 
behaviors (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Based on this rationale, we focus on employee effort to 
avoid future accidents (safety compliance), employee withdrawal, and counterproductive behaviors 
of production deviance and sabotage as the outcomes in our model.  
We aim to make three contributions. First, we add to the occupational safety literature by 
examining implications of accident involvement for subsequent behaviors. We integrate the 
learned helplessness and occupational safety literatures and explore the conditions under which 
reactions to accident involvement are more, or less, damaging to compliance and workplace 
behaviors. Thus, we provide a theory-based explanation to how employees react to accident 
involvement, and conditions that can help restore morale and productivity following accidents. 
Second, we contribute to the psychological empowerment literature. In the past, empowerment has 
been examined as a predictor of safety outcomes including accidents and injuries (Nahrgang et al., 
2011). We propose that in addition to contributing to a safe environment, psychological 
empowerment also shapes reactions to accidents. Finally, we make a contribution by testing our 
model in a sample of steel manufacturing employees in Southern Turkey. Steel manufacturing is 
routinely listed among the most dangerous jobs in the US (Time Inc., 2014). Turkey is one of the 
top 10 steel producers in the world (World Steel Association, 2015) and the least safe country for 
workers in Europe, with over 1,800 deaths due to workplace accidents and occupational illnesses 
in 2014 (İşçi Sağlığı ve İş Güvenliği Meclisi, 2017). Thus, our study was conducted in an 
understudied region, in a setting where serious accidents are common, and the threat of accidents is 
high and salient. 
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Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Learned Helplessness Theory 
 Seligman (1972; 1975) proposed learned helplessness theory as an explanation for why 
exposure to unpleasant or aversive stimuli results in differential reactions in victims. Findings 
suggest that there is a marked variation in reactions to undesirable events depending on the degree 
to which the victim has control over the situation. In general, the absence of control results in a 
belief that future action is futile and there is not much the person can do to alter future course of 
events. As a result, aversive events, coupled with feelings of absence of control, have implications 
for future behaviors and the mental state of the individual.  
Maier and Seligman (1976) noted that those who are exposed to aversive stimuli or shocks 
under the low control condition react in three predictable ways. First, their motivation to avoid the 
aversive event in the future is typically lower. This is because individuals come to view their 
actions as disconnected from future consequences (Peterson & Seligman, 1983). Second, they 
mentally disengage from the environment, responding in passive and withdrawn ways such as 
behavioral withdrawal and cognitive distancing (Mikulincer, 2013). Finally, they suffer emotional 
distress and display maladaptive behaviors. Even though learned helplessness has long been 
associated with withdrawal symptoms, there is also evidence that it is associated with anger (Roth 
& Kubal, 1975). For example, research has shown that exposure to aggressive supervisory 
behaviors in a work context coupled with low control resulted in deviant behaviors and displaced 
aggression (Mitchell & Ambrose, 2012) suggesting that a third alternative way in which 
individuals may react to learned helplessness is through retaliatory behaviors.  
 Thus, based on learned helplessness theory, we predict that accident involvement will be 
associated with negative outcomes to the degree to which employees perceive that they lack 
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control. In the management literature, ability of employees to shape their own environment is often 
studied under the psychological empowerment construct (Spreitzer, 1995). Empowerment reflects 
the psychological sense that the person has power, because they have the ability to control their 
environment. Psychological empowerment consists of the perception that one can perform their 
tasks competently, have autonomy to decide how to do their jobs, and their behavior makes a 
difference (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990). Empowerment allows employees to cope with stressors 
more constructively (Erdogan & Bauer, 2009; Fisher, 2014) and enables employees to adjust to the 
demands of their jobs in uncertain environments (Firth, Chen, Kirkman, & Kim, 2014).  
Psychological empowerment has been identified as an important predictor of attitudes, 
performance, and turnover intentions (Seibert, Wang, & Courtright, 2011). In the occupational 
safety literature, psychological empowerment has been shown to be related to subsequent safety 
outcomes. For example, in a sample of hospital employees, psychological empowerment was 
related to safety participation (Ford & Tetrick, 2011). Further, empowerment within teams 
negatively predicted unsafe behaviors and accidents (Hechanova-Alampay & Beehr, 2001).   
 It is our contention that in addition to contributing to overall safety, employee 
empowerment will interact with accident involvement to predict employee reactions. Accident 
involvement is likely to trigger symptoms of helplessness for employees who experience low 
empowerment, because the employee feels little control over work. For these employees, 
involvement in an accident is likely to be related to lower likelihood to engage in safety 
compliance, higher likelihood to withdraw, and engagement in counterproductive behaviors.  
Outcomes of Accident Involvement as Moderated by Psychological Empowerment 
 Early learned helplessness experiments confirmed that when an individual was exposed to 
unpleasant stimuli, those who engaged in behaviors to avoid it in the future tended to be those who 
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had control in earlier rounds of the experiment (Maier & Seligman, 1976), whereas those who 
experienced the aversive event in the absence of control showed no such positive reactions. It is 
thought that the combination of lack of control and aversive experiences has negative motivational 
implications because the person does not expect such efforts to yield positive outcomes (Frese & 
Fay, 2001). In organizational settings, researchers have proposed that the experience of learned 
helplessness resulting from negative events under low control would result in lack of interest in 
altering one’s behavior (George & Jones, 2001). In the context of safety, this would suggest that 
employees who were involved in an accident are more likely to behave in ways to avoid an 
accident in the future to the degree to which they feel empowered. Safety compliance refers to 
complying with safety regulations and includes behaviors such as following safety rules, 
encouraging coworkers to be safe, taking proactive actions to increase safety, and escalating safety 
risks to one’s supervisor (Clarke, 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2006). In other words, the motivation to 
avoid accidents in the future will be higher among those who experienced an accident under high 
empowerment. 
Hypothesis 1. Accident involvement and psychological empowerment will interact to 
predict employee safety compliance such that accident involvement will be positively 
related to compliance when empowerment is high, but will be unrelated when 
empowerment is low.   
 Second, withdrawal is thought to be a key reaction to learned helplessness (Martinko, 
Gundlach, & Douglas, 2002). Individuals who experience aversive events along with a lack of 
control withdraw from the context and reduce their meaningful involvement in tasks (Baum & 
Gatchel, 1981). One type of withdrawal is to exit the situation. For example, past research on 
occupational safety has shown that being injured at work is positively related to turnover intentions 
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(McCaughey et al., 2012; Young & Corsun, 2009). However, employees can also withdraw from 
their jobs without physically leaving. In fact, researchers contended that withdrawal without 
leaving is a more probable reaction compared to exit given that employees suffering from 
helplessness tend to see their current work situation as less likely to change, resulting in behaviors 
that indicate reduced effort on the job (Hulin, Roznowski, & Hachiya, 1985; Zimmerman, Swider, 
Woo, & Allen, 2016). Withdrawal behaviors include coming to work late, staying home claiming 
to be sick, and taking long breaks (Spector et al., 2006). Therefore, we predict that withdrawal is a 
potential response to accident involvement when coupled with low empowerment.  
Hypothesis 2. Accident involvement and psychological empowerment will interact to 
predict withdrawal such that accident involvement will be positively related to withdrawal 
when empowerment is low, but will be unrelated when empowerment is high.   
Finally, the theory of learned helplessness predicts that employees who experience aversive 
events under conditions of low control would have more emotional disruption and therefore 
behave in ways that are more destructive and maladaptive (Maier & Seligman, 1976). Early on, 
studies of learned helplessness have shown that when experiencing uncontrollable and aversive 
stimuli, victims showed symptoms consistent with depression and withdrawal, and that they were 
less likely to behave in aggressive ways. However, in contrast to these prior findings, subsequent 
work suggests that one symptom of learned helplessness is feelings of aggression and resentment, 
and engaging in hostile and aggressive actions in a covert way (Berkowitz, 1983). In other words, 
we expect that in addition to withdrawing from the situation, employees may engage in covert 
behaviors that indicate anger and resentment.  
Counterproductive behaviors are ways in which employees display negative emotions and 
covert aggressive behaviors at work and they include production deviance (purposefully ignoring 
ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT                                                                                                     11 
 
instructions or slowing down work) and sabotage (including behaviors such as harming or wasting 
the equipment and organizational resources). Research has shown that production deviance serves 
as a coping mechanism for emotionally exhausted employees (Krischer, Penney, & Hunter, 2010) 
and production deviance and sabotage have been shown to be related to anger (Spector et al., 
2006). As a result, we predict that accident involvement will have implications for 
counterproductive work behaviors in the form of production deviance and sabotage.  
Hypothesis 3. Accident involvement and psychological empowerment will interact to 
predict production deviance (Hypothesis 3a) and sabotage (Hypothesis 3b) such that 
accident involvement will be positively related to production deviance and sabotage for 
employees who have low levels of empowerment, whereas the relationship will be 
nonsignificant for employees who have high empowerment.  
Method 
Sample and Procedures 
We collected data from employees and supervisors of a leading iron and steel manufacturer 
in Southern Turkey. The company produces iron bars, reinforcing bars, and earthquake resistant 
steel, and provides harbor services. Our study took place in departments throughout the company 
including the blooming mill, electricity maintenance, steelworks, quality assurance, supporting 
units, machine maintenance, and harbor services.  
We collected employee data via three surveys (T1, T2, and T3) distributed one month apart, 
followed by one supervisor survey (T4), taking place one month following the completion of the 
last employee survey. The Time 1 (T1) survey included demographics and several control 
variables. The Time 2 (T2) survey included a measure of psychological empowerment. The Time 3 
(T3) survey measured accident involvement, the safety climate (control), and safety compliance. 
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Finally, the Time 4 (T4) survey included a supervisor measure of employee withdrawal, 
production deviance, and sabotage. Surveys were in a paper-and-pencil format. Packets were 
distributed to all employees performing safety-sensitive jobs (n = 838). Each employee was 
assigned a unique code written on each survey in order to facilitate the matching process. 
Supervisors were given the name of the employee and an associated code, and were asked to only 
write the code on their survey. Employees returned their completed surveys in sealed envelopes 
into sealed collection boxes. These boxes were collected by the second author.  
Initially, 838 surveys were distributed, and 715 were returned (response rate = 85%). The 
second survey was distributed to 826 employees and 656 were received (response rate = 79%). The 
third survey was distributed to 820 and 498 were returned (response rate = 61%). Finally, we 
received surveys from 86 supervisors. After dropping surveys with missing time periods and data, 
we retained 392 dyads (392 employees and 66 supervisors), for a final overall response rate of 
47%. The 392 employees were 99% male, 36.68 years of age (SD = 8.46), had 9.74 years (SD = 
7.94) of organizational tenure, and were mostly high school graduates (50.8%). Supervisors were 
43.13 years of age (SD = 8.48), 98% were male, and had worked in the organization for 16.85 
years (SD = 9.26). A majority of the supervisors were high school graduates (51.8%).   
Measures 
All measures were rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) unless otherwise noted. All items were translated into Turkish following 
established back-translation procedures as outlined by Brislin (1970).   
Accident involvement. Employees were asked to report the number of times they were 
involved in an accident in the past six months and were presented with a checklist to help them 
remember their involvement. We focused on the prior six-month period to increase the probability 
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of recall. The checklist was adapted from Barling et al.’s (2002) safety-related incidents scale. 
Sample items included “Something fell on me” and “Had my hand in contact with a blade.” We 
modified the items to apply to a manufacturing setting. The most frequently occurring events were 
hurting oneself while lifting something heavy (43 employees), burning one’s hand by touching 
something hot (22 employees), and spilling something hot on one’s body (20 employees). Overall, 
19% of employees (74 employees) had been involved in at least one safety incident in the past 6 
months. We operationalized accident involvement as 0 = No involvement in an accident in the past 
six months, 1 = involved in at least one accident in the past six months.  
Of those 74 employees who reported having been involved in an accident in the past six 
months, 81% reported 1-10 accidents. The remainder (n = 14) reported numbers ranging between 
11 and 128. Using the method described by Moore and McCabe (1999), in our dataset employees 
reporting 14 or more accidents may be regarded as outliers. The exclusion of cases who reported 
14 or more accidents (12 employees) did not result in any changes in our reported results. Further, 
our operationalization of accident involvement as a 0-1 dichotomy would alleviate any concern 
regarding inflated reports of accidents. Therefore, we report the results with all respondents.  
Psychological empowerment. We measured empowerment using the 12-item scale 
developed by Spreitzer (1995). A sample item was “I have significant autonomy in determining 
how I do my job” (α = .88). 
Safety compliance. Employees reported their compliance with safety procedures using an 
11-item scale developed by Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask (1998). A sample item was “I 
follow all safety procedures regardless of the situation I am in” (α = .80). 
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Employee withdrawal. Supervisors rated employee withdrawal using four items from 
Spector et al. (2006). A sample item was “Takes longer breaks than he/she is allowed to take.” (α = 
.80).  
Production deviance. Supervisors rated employee production deviance using three items 
from Spector et al. (2006). A sample item was “Purposely fails to follow instructions” (α = .81). 
Sabotage. Supervisors rated employee sabotage using three items from Spector et al. 
(2006). A sample item was “Purposely wastes employer’s materials and supplies” (α = .87). 
Control variables. We controlled for the personality trait of risk-taking, employee level in 
the hierarchy, organizational tenure, and education measured at T1, and safety climate measured at 
T3. Risk-taking was controlled because employees with higher risk-taking orientation may behave 
less safe, and experience more accidents (Westaby & Lowe, 2005). Five items from Westaby and 
Lowe (2005) were used to assess employee risk-taking orientation. A sample item was “I get my 
job done faster by taking risks” (α = .68). Safety climate was an important control because the 
relationship between accident involvement and outcomes may simply reflect the established 
relationship between safety climate and outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2010). Employees reported their 
perceptions of safety climate using the 10-item scale by Zohar (2000). A sample item was “My 
supervisor approaches workers during work to discuss safety issues” (α = .85). Level, education, 
and tenure were controlled, because employees who work in higher levels, highly educated 
employees, or those who have been in the organization for a long time may both feel empowered 
and report more positive attitudes and behaviors, providing an explanation for the observed 
relationships. Level was coded as 1-3, with 1 representing the lowest level employees. Tenure was 
in years. Education was coded as 0 = less than elementary school diploma to 9 = graduate degree.  
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Results 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented in Table 1. Due to the high 
correlation among supervisor rated outcomes, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. The 
baseline model specifying distinct factors for the three outcomes had modest fit (χ2 = 167.70, df = 
32, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .10) but was superior to the alternative nested models where production 
deviance and sabotage (∆χ2 = 103.22, ∆df = 2, p < .01), production deviance and withdrawal (∆χ2 = 
132.14, ∆df = 2, p < .01), and sabotage and withdrawal (∆χ2 = 23.82, ∆df = 2, p < .01), were 
specified to fall under the same factor, as well as a model where a single factor was specified for 
all three outcomes (∆χ2 = 149.97, ∆df = 3, p < .01). 
Due to the nested nature of our data where 392 employees reported to 66 supervisors, we 
tested our hypotheses using multilevel regression procedures in Mplus 7. Specifically, because 
employees worked within intact groups and experienced similar work environments, responses 
obtained from employees reporting to the same supervisor would likely share substantial variation. 
The intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the dependent variables were .20, .32, .41, and .45 for safety 
compliance, employee withdrawal, production deviance, and sabotage, respectively, suggesting 
that using multilevel methodology was warranted.  
 When testing all hypotheses, we specified two models for each dependent variable. The 
first model contained the control variables, and the main effects of accident involvement and 
psychological empowerment at within and between levels. In Model 2, we added the interaction 
term to both levels. A significant coefficient for the interaction term at the within level, coupled 
with a significant reduction in the deviance statistic between Model 1 and Model 2 were 
interpreted as support for a hypothesis. When a significant interaction was observed, we plotted the 
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interaction at one SD above and below the mean and probed whether each slope differed from zero 
following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003).  
 Even though we did not hypothesize main effects, we first examined the results to see 
whether accident involvement had any significant relations with the outcomes. Before we added 
the interaction term, accident involvement was positively related to employee withdrawal (γ = .14, 
SE = .07, t = 1.98, p < .05). Further, accident involvement was positively related to production 
deviance (γ = .15, SE = .07, t = 2.09, p < .05). However, given that we expected interactions with 
psychological empowerment, interpreting these main effects would not be appropriate.  
 The results for our hypotheses presented in Table 2 indicate no support for Hypothesis 1. 
Psychological empowerment was positively related to safety compliance, but there was no 
interaction with accident involvement. Other predictors of safety compliance included low levels 
of risk taking personality, and safety climate perceptions. The results for Hypothesis 2 are 
presented in Table 2. Adding the interaction term resulted in a significant reduction in deviance for 
employee withdrawal, and the interaction term was significant. As shown in Figure 1, accident 
involvement had a positive relationship with employee withdrawal behaviors when empowerment 
was low (simple slope: γ =.30, SE = .10, t = 3.11, p < .01). When empowerment was high, there 
was no relationship (simple slope: γ = -.03, SE = .07, t = -.40, p > .05).  
 The results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b are presented in Table 3. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is significant for both production deviance and sabotage. Adding the interaction 
term to the equation reduced deviance only for production deviance, and not for sabotage, 
indicating support for Hypothesis 3a, but not for 3b. At the same time, the interaction term was 
significant for both production deviance and sabotage, so we plotted and explored the nature of 
both interactions. Plots of the interactions (Figures 2a and 2b) and simple slope analyses suggested 
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that accident involvement was positively related to production deviance when empowerment was 
low (γ = .31, SE = .10, t = 3.30, p < .01) and unrelated when empowerment was high (γ = -.03, SE 
= .09, t = -.31, p > .05). Further, accident involvement was positively related to sabotage when 
empowerment was low (γ = .17, SE = .05, t = 3.17, p < .01) and unrelated when empowerment was 
high (γ = .00, SE = .06, t = .10, p > .05). These results provided support for Hypotheses 3a.  
 For Hypothesis 3b, the pattern of the interaction with respect to sabotage included some 
surprising relationships. On the one hand, these results support the learned helplessness 
explanation: when empowerment is low, accident involvement is related to higher levels of 
sabotage. In other words, individuals who experience low empowerment are disinclined to engage 
in sabotage, which is a tendency that disappears when they experience an accident. On the other 
hand, these results indicate that high empowerment is associated with greater likelihood of 
engaging in sabotage. We discuss these findings in more detail in the discussion section.  
Supplemental Analyses 
 Our main analyses treat all accident involvement equally. However, accident severity may 
affect the ability of empowerment to neutralize the effects of accident involvement. For example, 
Burke and Signal (2010) observed that reactions to accidents resulting in injuries could differ from 
those without injuries. To test for this possibility, we performed additional analyses. As part of our 
T3 questionnaire, employees had reported (using an instrument by Barling et al., 2002) whether 
they had experienced any of the eight types of injuries in the past six months. Of the 74 employees 
who had been involved in an accident in the past six months, 46 also reported an injury. We 
recoded accident involvement as 0 = did not experience an accident in the past six months, 1 = 
experienced an accident not resulting in an injury, and 2 = experienced an accident resulting in an 
injury. This null-based coding scheme is appropriate for reflecting both the absence of a 
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phenomenon and its presence with varying degrees of severity (Feinstein, 1996). The results were 
consistent with the main results such that the interaction term showed the same pattern of relations 
with production deviance (γ = -.13, SE = .06, t = -2.20, p < .05), withdrawal (γ = -.12, SE = .04, t = 
-3.23, p < .01), and sabotage (γ = -.09, SE = .04, t = -2.10, p < .05) and remained unrelated to 
safety compliance (γ = -.04, SE = .03, t = -1.08, p > .05).  
 Given the correlated outcomes, an alternative test of our model is through multilevel path 
analysis. When we specified our model using this approach, the number of parameters exceeded 
number of clusters, deeming estimates unreliable. Modifying our model so that all predictors were 
entered at the within, but not between level yielded results parallel with the main results we report, 
with the interaction term having similar relations to outcomes except for sabotage which had a 
slightly higher p value (γ = -.06, p > .05 for safety compliance, γ = -.24, p < .01 for withdrawal, γ = 
-.25, p < .05 for production deviance, and γ = -.11, p = .08 for sabotage). These additional results 
further suggest that out of the three significant interactions, sabotage is the least stable one.   
 Finally, we tested the possibility that instead of empowerment, safety climate may act as a 
buffer of accident involvement. Even though empowerment is a direct measure of control over 
one’s work, employees may also have elevated sense of control when they perceive safety climate. 
When we tested our interactions using safety climate as moderator, the interaction was significant 
only with respect to production deviance (γ = -.10, p < .05), with high safety climate neutralizing 
the positive relation between accident involvement and production deviance. In other words, safety 
climate was a weak surrogate for the control afforded by psychological empowerment.   
Discussion 
 Given the prevalence of workplace accidents, the limited understanding of accident 
involvement outcomes is surprising. To date, the occupational safety literature tended to focus on 
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predictors of accidents and injuries (Nahrgang et al., 2011). Adopting an error management in 
addition to error prevention perspective (Frese & Keith, 2015) in the workplace safety context 
would suggest that we need more systematic investigations of outcomes of accident involvement. 
So far, these investigations focused on cognitive and behavioral reactions to accidents in the form 
of reflection, and how accident involvement could result in learning, safety motivation, and 
reduction in subsequent accidents (Burke & Signal, 2010; Drupsteen & Guldenmund, 2014). The 
experience of accident involvement and how it affects a broader set of workplace behaviors, and 
the conditions under which these occur are understudied yet important topics.  
Drawing from learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975), we examined psychological 
empowerment as a factor that could mitigate the negative implications of accident involvement on 
safety compliance, withdrawal, production deviance, and sabotage. Accident involvement was 
positively related to manager rated withdrawal and production deviance. Further, the relationship 
between accident involvement and outcomes was conditional on psychological empowerment such 
that employees who experienced lower empowerment reacted to accidents in the form of higher 
withdrawal, production deviance, and sabotage. No main effects or moderated effects were 
observed for safety compliance. The results suggest that experiencing an accident and perceiving 
low levels of control over one’s job and environment were related to a situation where employees 
were more withdrawn and engaged in covert types of retaliation, but did not affect employees’ 
subsequent efforts to avoid future accidents in the form of safety compliance.   
Theoretical Implications 
 Theoretically, our results suggest that accident involvement is a meaningful predictor of 
workplace attitudes and behaviors controlling for safety climate. Experiencing accidents in a 
context where employees feel low empowerment was associated with withdrawal and maladaptive 
ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT                                                                                                     20 
 
behaviors. Past research on errors shows that especially when employees reflect and discuss their 
mistakes and are guided through the process, they learn from them (e.g., Ellis et al., 2006; 
Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003). Our findings add to this literature by showing that a 
lack of control may result in a different kind of learning, resulting in outcomes that are consistent 
with a learned helplessness theory explanation.  
Further, our results point to the important role psychological empowerment plays in 
buffering the experience of accidents and preventing serious damage to workplace behaviors and 
attitudes. To date, studies of workplace safety have shown that psychological empowerment is 
positively related to safety performance (e.g., Hechanova-Alampay & Beehr, 2001). Our study 
points out to an additional path by which psychological empowerment is relevant to workplace 
safety: To those employees experiencing low empowerment, experiencing an accident is 
accompanied by higher withdrawal from the job, and behaving in ways that may be interpreted as 
retaliation. It is likely that those employees who feel empowered do not experience a sense of 
helplessness that may accompany a workplace accident. When trying to understand differing 
reactions to accidents by organizational agents and insiders, it seems important to consider the role 
of psychological empowerment, as those who feel in control of their jobs seem not to differ from 
those who did not experience an accident with respect to their work attitudes and behaviors.  
One of our hypotheses did not receive any support, and would benefit from further 
investigation. Specifically, accident involvement had no relationship with safety compliance. It is 
important to note that self-reported safety compliance was quite high (with an average of 4.29), so 
social desirability may be a concern. Alternatively, because the cost of being unsafe is high and 
directly affects employees, employees show high levels of safety compliance regardless of their 
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involvement in an accident. Future research would benefit from examining more objective 
recordings of safety incidents and subsequent safety compliance to provide a stronger test.  
The finding that empowerment is positively related to sabotage is an interesting and 
unexpected finding, which differentiates sabotage from other counterproductive behaviors we 
examined. Sabotage is a risky activity and includes behaviors such as damaging equipment and 
property and therefore low empowerment may prevent individuals from displaying higher levels of 
this behavior. These results are consistent with Mackey, Frieder, Perrewé, Gallagher, and Brymer’s 
(2015) finding that high empowerment was associated with higher counterproductive behaviors. In 
other words, our findings suggested that more work on the dark side of empowerment is an 
important avenue of future research.  
Practical Implications 
 Our results suggest that accidents have hidden costs. In addition to well-known effects of 
accidents in the form of medical expenses, higher insurance premiums, and time lost, accidents 
have the potential to interfere with employer-employee relationship. Employees who have been in 
an accident withdraw from their work by engaging in lateness or absenteeism, purposefully slow 
down production, and even engage in sabotage. Accounting for these negative effects are 
important both to understand the true cost of unsafe workplaces, and to prevent future accidents. 
Our results also suggest that psychological empowerment may serve as a way to inoculate 
employees against the harmful effects. Employees who feel empowered react to accident 
involvement differently from those who perceive lower levels of empowerment. The sense that one 
has control over their own work and impact on the environment seems to be the key difference 
between those who experience withdrawal and high counterproductive behaviors and those who do 
not. Therefore, empowerment may be a promising candidate as a safety intervention.  
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 Our results speak to the possibility that how managers prevent accidents and how they 
manage accident aftermath may require complimentary but different approaches. A key tool for 
accident prevention is fostering a safety climate (Clarke, 2006). The most commonly used 
measures of safety climate (e.g., Zohar, 2000) focus on actions and attitudes of managers, such as 
managers paying close attention to safety, approaching employees frequently about safety, and 
keeping track of safety problems. Some of this emphasis on supervisor behaviors, if taken too far, 
could be at tension with psychological empowerment. Our findings suggest that while safety 
climate is critically important, organizations would benefit from cultivating it without impeding on 
psychological empowerment. During the accident aftermath, reinforcing felt empowerment by 
involving employees in safety decisions, seeking their input, and allowing them to suggest changes 
may be helpful in tempering the negative outcomes of accident involvement.   
Potential Limitations and Future Research Directions 
As in any field study, our study has potential limitations. First, we were unable to include 
an objective metric of accident involvement and had to rely in employee recollections. We feel 
confident that given a time period of six months and the use of a checklist, employees should be 
able to recollect whether they had been involved in an accident. Further, not all accident 
involvement would be reflected in organizational records (Probst et al., 2008), particularly in a 
developing country context where enforcement of reporting requirements are lax. At the same 
time, due to the retrospective nature of our accident involvement data, our sample would lack 
employees who experienced an accident and later left the organization. We included an accident 
involvement measure in the T3 employee survey, which was the closest survey to when we 
measured study outcomes from supervisor’s perspective at T4. This approach meant that we were 
unable to capture any accidents that may have occurred in the month between T3 and T4. 
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Supplementing these results with actual accident and injury records would be an important 
extension of our findings.  
 Our sample is from Southern Turkey, an underrepresented region in past workplace safety 
research. Before generalizing to other samples, it is important to consider the implications of our 
sample for our research questions. Steel manufacturing is a heavy manufacturing industry, 
involving lifting heavy materials, and working with extremely hot materials and toxins under noisy 
conditions, making this setting an appropriate and important one to explore the effects of 
accidents. According to Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, the industry is 
estimated to employ over 200,000 employees as of 2013 (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, 
2013), increasing the relevance and practical importance of these results. Further, psychological 
empowerment has been previously studied in Turkey, with results suggesting that employees react 
positively and benefit from empowerment (e.g., Erdogan & Bauer, 2009; Gumusluoglu & Ilsev, 
2009). Still, it is important to explore generalizability to other contexts. 
We did not have a measure of coworker observations of accidents. As such, our results only 
speak to experienced and reported accidents, but not necessarily observed accidents. One future 
avenue to consider is whether observed accidents result in similar outcomes to experienced 
accidents. In other words, do the learned helplessness effects occur only during direct involvement 
in an accident? Or do observations lead to similar outcomes? If they do, does empowerment act as 
a buffer of these effects, or are there other moderators, such as the attributions made for the 
accident? The situational and personal relevance of the coworker may also matter (Gyekye & 
Salminen, 2006) and may engender learned helplessness effects. In other words, delineating when 
coworker accident involvement could result in learned helplessness effects is an important research 
area, given that for any accident, there may be many more coworkers who witness it.  
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Our measure of accident involvement did not capture the severity of accidents. We 
performed supplemental analyses considering whether the employee had been injured, but we do 
not have a measure of accident-level data on how severe each incident was. Our sample came from 
one organization studied over four months, and despite the non-negligible number of employees 
who reported having experienced accidents in the prior six months, it is not a sample of employees 
having challenges with return to work. While we found empowerment to neutralize the positive 
effects of accident involvement on outcomes, it is unclear whether empowerment would be 
similarly helpful in cases of accidents resulting in acute injuries, job transfers or restrictions, and 
extended time away from work. Replicating these results in a sample of workers who recently 
experienced acute injuries and had return to work challenges is important.   
 In conclusion, we set out to examine the implications of accident involvement for 
employee attitudes and behaviors. Accident involvement has indirect costs in the form of higher 
withdrawal from the organization, higher production deviance, and sabotage. At the same time, 
organizations may be able to inoculate their employees against the harmful effects of accident 
involvement. Psychological empowerment directly contributes positively to safety compliance, and 
at the same time alleviates the negative implications of accident involvement on withdrawal, 
production deviance, and sabotage. The results indicate that the occupational safety literature 
would benefit from further investigations of accident involvement as a predictor, and 
psychological empowerment as a way to prevent learned helplessness in the workplace.   
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Variables 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Accident involvement (T3E)   .19 .39           
2. Empowerment (T2E) 3.93 .61 -.04          
3. Safety compliance (T3E) 4.29 .60  .04  .22**         
4. Employee withdrawal (T4M) 1.69 .64  .11* -.04 -.12*        
5. Production deviance (T4M) 1.90 .70  .14** -.02  .02 .52**       
6. Sabotage (T4M) 1.60 .50  .13* -.03 -.11* .67** .52**      
7. Risk taking  (T1E) 2.94 .82  .03 -.04 -.20** -.00 .00 -.01     
8. Safety climate (T3E) 3.99 .72  .01 .22**  .57** -.13* .02 -.08 -.17**    
9. Level (T1E) 1.17 .46 -.08 .25**  .07 .04 .09 -.02 -.02 .17**   
10. Tenure (T1E) 9.74 7.94 -.05 .20** .14** -.14** -.08 -.17** .01 .11* .16**  
11. Education  (T1E) 4.68 2.00  .05 .09 .19** -.03 .10* .02 -.03 .16** .30** -.30** 
 
n = 392. Accident involvement was coded as 0 = no accidents in the past 6 months, 1 = at least one accident reported in the past 6 months. Tenure is organizational 
tenure in years. Education ranges between 0 and 9. Level is level in hierarchy and was coded from 1 to 3. T1, T2, T3, T4 refer to timing of measurement and are 
separated by one month each. E and M refer to Employee and Manager surveys.  
* p <.05; ** p <.01. 




Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 Safety Compliance Employee Withdrawal  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Estimate SE t Estimate SE t Estimate SE T Estimate SE t 
Intercept 4.18 .17 25.37** 4.19 .17 25.15** 1.44 .81  1.78 1.48 1.12  1.32 
Risk taking  -.06 .02 -2.91** -.06 .02 -2.92** -.03 .03   -.87  -.03 .03   -.90 
Safety climate   .12 .04   3.38**  .12 .04  3.39**  .00 .04   -.01   .00 .04    .07 
Level -.13 .09  -1.48 -.14 .09 -1.52  .03 .26    .12  -.00 .26   -.01 
Tenure  .00 .01    -.07  .00 .01   -.07 -.01 .01 -1.40  -.01 .01 -1.40 
Education   .01 .01   1.13  .01 .01  1.12 -.02 .01 -2.11*  -.03 .01 -2.48* 
Accident involvement -.10 .06  -1.78 -.10 .06 -1.80  .14 .07 1.98*   .14 .06  2.18* 
Psychological 
empowerment 
  .04 .02   1.81  .05 .02 2.16*  .03 .05   .50   .09 .05  1.77 
Accident x 
empowerment 
 -.03 .05  -.62      -.27 .09   -3.04** 
Deviance  
(-2*log likelihood) 
7261.99 7264.33 7548.20 7540.56 
Δ df  2  2 
Deviance change  -2.34  7.64* 
R2 6.7% 6.7% 2.2% 3.6% 
n = 392. Safety compliance is employee rated, and employee withdrawal is manager rated. Accident involvement was 
coded as 0 = no accidents in the past 6 months, 1 = at least one accident in the past 6 months. Level is level in 
hierarchy and was coded from 1 to 3. Tenure is organizational tenure in years. Education ranges between 0 and 9. 
Results are within-level estimates.  
* p <.05; ** p <.01.   




Tests of Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
 
 
n = 392. Accident involvement was coded as 0 = no accidents in the past 6 months, 1 = at least one accident in the past 
6 months. Level is level in hierarchy and was coded from 1 to 3. Tenure is organizational tenure in years. Education 
ranges between 0 and 9. Results are within-level estimates. 
* p <.05; ** p <.01.   
 Production Deviance Sabotage 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Estimate SE     t Estimate SE     t Estimate SE     t Estimate SE     t 
Intercept 1.58 1.09   1.45 1.72 1.42  1.21 1.36 .88 1.54 1.39 1.03  1.35 
Risk taking -.01 .03  -.17 -.01 .03   -.32 -.03 .03  -.99  -.03 .03 -1.01 
Safety climate  .01 .05    .28  .02 .05    .35  .04 .03  1.05   .04 .03  1.07 
Level  .11 .19    .59  .07 .18    .39 -.21 .12 -1.59  -.23 .13 -1.80 
Tenure -.01 .01   -.89 -.00 .01   -.87 -.01 .00 -1.69  -.01 .00 -1.71 
Education -.01 .01 -1.20 -.02 .01 -1.55  .00 .01    .07 -.00 .01   -.14 
Accident 
involvement 
 .15 .07  2.09* .14 .06  2.27*  .09 .05  1.86  .09 .05   1.91 
Psychological 
empowerment 
-.02 .05 -.47 .04 .04  1.10  .05 .03  1.47  .08 .03  2.60** 
Accident x 
empowerment 




7577.18 7569.84 7288.77 7284.01 
Δ df  2  2 
Deviance 
change 
 7.35*  4.76 
R2 1.5% 3.1% 4.1% 4.8% 





Figure 1. Interaction of accident involvement and psychological empowerment to predict 
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Figure 2a. Interaction of accident involvement and psychological empowerment to predict 




Figure 2b. Interaction of accident involvement and psychological empowerment to predict 
manager rated sabotage.  
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